

# Reverse Engineering Chinese Government Information Controls<sup>1</sup>

Gary King<sup>2</sup>

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Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 12/31/2019

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<sup>1</sup>Based on joint work with Jennifer Pan (Stanford) and Margaret Roberts (UCSD)

<sup>2</sup>GaryKing.org

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
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
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
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
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It's antidisestablishmentarianism!

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**Evidence?** A few anecdotes; “no ground truth”; “no successful attempts to quantify” 50c party activity; even several analyses with made up dependent variables!

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- **Distracts**; redirects public attention from criticism and central issues to **cheerleading** and positive discussions of valence issues

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
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
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


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
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
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  - **No evidence of 50c (or any piecemeal) payments;** probably part of their jobs

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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50c Status

Origin

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---

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Predicted 50c	Across China	

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Predicted 50c	Across China	59%

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  - Admits to the existence of the 50c party
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## For more information



[GaryKing.org](http://GaryKing.org)



[JenPan.com](http://JenPan.com)



[MargaretRoberts.net](http://MargaretRoberts.net)