

Reverse Engineering Chinese Government Information Controls¹

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National Taiwan University, 5/30/2018

¹Based on joint work with Jennifer Pan (Stanford) and Margaret Roberts (UCSD)

²GaryKing.org

Papers

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- Empirical Results:

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
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
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 - Disagreements between central and local leaders

Censorship Reveals Government Goals


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
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Censorship Reveals Government Goals



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It's antidisestablishmentarianism!

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Evidence? A few anecdotes; “no ground truth”; “no successful attempts to quantify” 50c party activity; even several analyses with made up dependent variables!

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- Does not argue; does not engage on controversial issues
- **Distracts**; redirects public attention from criticism and central issues to **cheerleading** and positive discussions of valence issues

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
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
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


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
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
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 - **No evidence of 50c (or any piecemeal) payments;** probably part of their jobs

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Categories and Analyses of 50c Party Posts


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
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Content of Leaked and Predicted 50c Party Posts


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
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
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
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
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
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 - 47% on commercial sites (1 of every 178 posts)

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


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Survey Validation of 50c Party Membership Predictions

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50c Status

Origin

Percent Yes

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50c Status	Origin	Percent Yes
Predicted 50c	Across China	

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50c Status	Origin	Percent Yes
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
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
not significantly different



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For more information



GaryKing.org



JenPan.com



MargaretRoberts.net